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or whether or not the case was tried upon its merits. 6 This is true in spite
of the fact that the statute states that the pleadings shall be "deemed to be
amended in the Supreme Court.' 7 Since the courts in the face of the express
language of the statute have the tendency to look for other factors, it is
obvious that any prediction of what the court will do based upon a literal
construction of the statute will be unavailing and will afford lawyers very
little satisfaction.
In order to make a prediction as to what the courts will do with greater
assurance, it would, perhaps, be well to consider the office of a pleading.
Pleadings must be considered as merely tools in reaching a fair decision and
they must not be looked upon as the ultimate end of the law In themselves,
as they are sometimes stated to have been regarded by the common law.8
The modern view is that the pleading should give fair notice of the pleader's
case to the opposing party and to the court. The strict doctrine of the theory
of the case arose, to aid the pleadings in fulfilling their purpose. The
application of the theory to a specific case results in the defendant's knowledge
of the plaintiff's theory of recovery and his subsequent protection against a
change of that theory. If this fact will -be kept in mind it will be easier
to determine when the courts will follow the doctrine of the theory of the
case. In the principal case the cause was submitted upon an agreed statement
of facts. It is evident that in such a case there would be no reason for
the application of the doctrine, for both the opposing party and the court
have notice of the facts upon which the plaintiff is going to rely. The court
for this reason was correct in refusing to apply the doctrine. In other
words where the correct and fair conclusion is reached, the ultimate purpose
of the pleadings has been gained, and the application of any theory which
would disturb the decision would operate to defeat the purpose of the
pleadings.
As has been seen above, it may not be assumed, however, that the doctrine
is of no consequence today. Its existence must be appreciated by the legal
profession in spite of the statute that would seem to supercede it. The fact
that the courts judiciously apply the doctrine to carry out the purpose of the
pleadings, does not justify their disregarding the statute. The application
of the theory being inconsistent with the obvious meaning of the statute, that
theory should not be applied without a concurrent holding that the statute is
invalid. 0. E. G.
ADOPTION-RIGHT OF PARENT TO NoTicE.-An action to quiet title to land
was brought by appellants, brothers and sisters of the deceased. In 1924 the
deceased and her husband brought proceedings to adopt the appellee. Their
petition was granted and the appellee was adjudged their heir at law. Now
that the adoptive parents have died seised of real property, the appellants
seek to have their title to the land quieted as against the appellee. They
6 Hosanna et al. v. Odishoo (1933), 2 Ind. Adv. Rep. 532, 187 N. E. 897,
Hawkins et al. v. Thompson (1919), 69 Ind. App. 605, 122 N. E. 431. Both
of these cases being directly in point go to some length to show that the
parties were not misled.
7Sec. 2-3231 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. (1933).
8 Clark, Code Pleading, page 28.
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contend, first, that the court did not have jurisdiction of the adoption pro-
ceeding because appellee's natural father was not served in the proceeding;
second, that there was no allegation that he was not living. Held, the petition
was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and the right to attack the validity
of the proceeding because no notice was given to the natural parents is not
available to the presumptive heirs.1
Adoption did not exist at common law, but was taken from the Roman
Law. 2 It is thus wholly statutory. At first, courts were inclined to construe
these statutes strictly, on the theory that they were in derogation of the rights
of the natural heirs.3 But even where this view was accepted, some jurisdic-
tions, including Indiana, barred an action by the presumptive heirs on the
ground of estoppel. 4 However, the recent tendency is to abandon these views
and construe adoption statutes liberally, on the theory that they are not in
derogation of common law rights but make a complete change in the law.5
That this transition was actually taking place is evidenced by those cases
in which both the estoppel theory and the theory of liberal construction are
applied.6 Indiana has subscribed to this liberal tendency in Jones V. Leeds.7
An examination of the Indiana statutes shows that the petition in an
adoption proceeding must allege: name of the petitioner, name of the child,
its age, and what property, if any, it owns, whether the child has a father
or mother living, and, if so, where they reside. 8 These requirements have
been held jurisdictional and hence the facts required therein must be alleged
in order for the court to have jurisdiction.9 In another section it is provided
that the court should not decree the adoption of such child unless the natural
father or mother appears in open court and consents thereto, or files a verified
consent with the clerk of the court.1 0 So it has been held that failure to
'Hunter v. Bradshaw (1935), 198 N. E. 73 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).
2 In re Perry (1925), 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N. E. 163.
3 Furgeson v. Jones (1888), 17 Or. 204, 20 Pac. 842. Here the failure
of the record to show that the natural father of the child consented to the
adoption was held to be a jurisdictional defect of which the presumptive
heirs could take advantage in a collateral proceeding, though the record
showed that the mother of the child consented to the adoption, and that,
on obtaining a divorce from the child's father she had been awarded its
custody. So also in Morris v. Dooley (1894), 59 Ark. 483, 28 S. W 30.
Petition here failed to state that the child resided in the county in which
the decree was rendered, though it was required by statute that the child
should be a resident of that county. It was held that an heir at law was
entitled to take advantage of this defect in an action of ejectment brought
by him after the death of the adopting parent.4 Brown v. Brown (1884), 101 Ind. 340; Coleman v. Coleman (1906), 81
Ark. 7, 98 S. W 733, Re Camp (1901), 131 Calif. 469, 63 Pac. 736, Re McKeag
(1903), 141 Calif. 403, 74 Pac. 1039; Van Matre v. Sankly (1893), 148 Ill. 536,
36 N. E. 628; Rollo v. Bell (1920), 265 Pa. 503, 109 Atl. 159.
5 Kennedy v. Borah (1907), 226 I1. 24-3, 80 N. E. 767, Caldwel's Succession
(1905), 114 La. 195, 38 So. 140; Steanes v. Allen (1903), 183 Mass. 404, 67
N. E. 349; Adams v. Adams (1912), 102 Miss. 259, 59 So. 84, Re Pepin (1917),
53 Mont. 240, 163 Pac. 104, Re Ward (1908), 112 N. Y. Supp. 282.
6Re Reichel (1921), 148 Minn. 433, 182 N. W 517, Milligan v. McLaughlin
(1913), 94 Neb. 171, 142 N. W 675.
7 (1907), 41 Ind. App. 164, 83 N. E. 526.
8 Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated 1933, sec. 3-102.
9 In re Perry (1925), 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N. E. 163.
10 Burns' Indiana Annotated Statutes 1933, sec. 3-105.
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notify a mother of an illegitimate child of the adoption proceeding would
give grounds for setting the proceedings aside."1 But that case was tried
under the statute providing for adoption of deserted children, 1 2 and the
mother was bringing the action. So also in Lee v. Back,13 where failure to
give notice to the natural father was held to be fatal because the proceeding
was an adversary one. But here again the action was brought by a natural
parent, the father. Thus, it seems that Indiana is in accord with the great
weight of authority that an adoption proceeding will not be valid as against
the natural parents who have not abandoned their child unless they were
notified of the proceeding or have consented to it.14
The plaintiffs in this case were collateral heirs, brothers and sisters, of
the deceased adoptive mother. It has been held that presumptive heirs have
no right to attack an adoption proceeding before the death of the adoptive
parents because they have no vested rights at the time of which they can
claim to be deprived.' 5 When the adoptive parents get the decree and take
the child into their family and treat it as their child for a reasonable length
of time they are estopped to deny the validity of the proceedings by which
that child was adopted.16 This estoppel'has been extended to the presump-
tive heirs who claim through the adoptive parents and can have no better
rights than the adoptive parents had before the latter's death.17 Indiana
is in accord.18 It would seem that the heirs have no rights in such a case.
This provides the justification for the court's disregard of the mandatory
language of the statute.19
It is apparent that the Indiana court has followed the present tendency,
and although we have not gone as far as Maine, which has limited by
statute2 0 the right to attack the decree to the child by his next friend, or
the petitioner for adoption, it is submitted that the court has reached a
desirable result and on sound reasoning. D. C.
TAXATION-CONsrrUTioNALrrY OF INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX AcT.-Ap-
pellants, as taxpayers, sought to enjoin appellees from paying out funds of
the state for the printing of Chap. 50 of the Acts of 1933, p. 388, known as
the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. The act places a tax on the gross income, defined as gross
receipts, of the taxpayer received as compensation for personal services and
derived from trades, business or commerce, or the sale of real or personal
property without any deductions for expenses or losses. The rate of the
tax is either 1% of such gross receipts or 1/ of 1%, depending upon the
source of the income, e. g. income from mining, manufacturing, wholesaling,
11 Glansman v. Ledbetter (1920), 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230.
12 Burns' Indiana Annotated Statutes 1933, sec. 3-112.
13 (1868), 30 Ind. 148.
14 24 A. L. R. 416 and cases there cited.
15 Gray v. Gardner (1888), 81 Me. 554, 18 AtI. 286.
16 Parsons v. Parsons (1898), 101 Wise. 76, 77 N. W 147.
17Bird v. Young (1897), 56 Ohio St. 210, 46 N. E. 819; Wolf's Appeal
(1888), 10 Sadler Pa. 139, 13 At. 760; Mullaney's Adoption (1904), 25 Pa.
Super. Ct. 259.
1 8 Brown v Brown (1885), 101 Ind. 340.
19 Burns' Indiana Annotated Statutes 1933, sec. 3-105.
20 Revised Statutes Maine (1930), C. 80, see. 30.
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